This paper studies a model where individuals have imperfect information about their preferences or the environment and learning is costly. It shows that the endogenous decision to collect information before taking an action creates a systematic and testable bias in the aggregate behavior of rational, profit-maximizing agents. More precisely, individuals will have a tendency to bias their decision in favor of the actions that may potentially generate the highest benefits even if these may also generate the biggest losses. The paper thus shows that systematically biased choices do not necessarily imply that agents have irrational, systematically biased beliefs as it has been sometimes suggested. Applications to biases in career choices and judicial decisions are discussed. * Correspondence address: Isabelle Brocas or Juan D. Carrillo, Department of Economics, University of Southern California, 3620 S. Vermont Ave., Los Angeles, CA -90089, e-mail: <brocas@usc.edu> or <juandc@usc.edu>.
Motivation
It has been long established in Psychology that individuals have a systematically biased view of themselves and of the world in general (see e.g. Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) for an exhaustive list of biases in judgment when the environment is uncertain).
The recent behavioral economics literature has approached the issue of biased perceptions and biased behavior from different angles. One line of research takes human cognitive limitations as exogenously given and discusses their economic consequences. To give one example, in behavioral finance there are numerous studies on the effects, persistence and evolution of entrepreneurial optimism and entrepreneurial overconfidence in business decision-making. 1 Another line of research questions whether biased perceptions and behaviors are always the result of a limited cognitive ability to process information. In other words, instead of exogenously assuming the existence of a bias in beliefs, this second strand of the literature provides microeconomic foundations for some observed systematic biases in behavior. The arguments are based on hyperbolic discounting (Carrillo and (Bodner and Prelec (1997) ) and other utilities derived from beliefs (Yariv (2001 and 2002) ). These theories have received an important support due to their intuitive appeal and their capacity to render the homo-economicus more human. At the same time, all these models rely on some elements that depart from the standard neoclassical utility paradigm: hyperbolic discounting instead of exponential discounting or a utility enjoyed from beliefs rather than only from outcomes. Mainly for this reason, they have also provoked some criticisms (see e.g. Read (2001) and Rubinstein (2001) for arguments against hyperbolic discounting and Eliaz and Spiegler (2003) for arguments against a direct inclusion of beliefs in the utility function).
In this paper, individuals with imperfect knowledge about themselves (or about some element of the environment) choose between alternatives with different risks. We argue that if learning is feasible but costly, then the endogenous decision to collect information generates a systematic and testable bias in the aggregate behavior of the population. The paper thus falls in the second line of research discussed above, except that no element of our theory departs from the standard axioms of dynamic choice under uncertainty. 2 To present and illustrate our result, consider the following stylized example. Two cities have one judge each. These judges are identical in most respects: given the same belief about the culpability of a prisoner, not only they both choose the same sentence (convict or release), they even incur the same utility loss if the other sentence is executed. There is however one subtle difference between them: releasing the prisoner has the greatest variance in payoffs for the first judge (i.e., highest utility if innocent and lowest utility if guilty) whereas convicting the prisoner has the greatest variance in payoffs for the second judge (i.e., highest if guilty and lowest if innocent). Prior to announcing their sentence, each judge can acquire costly information about the culpability of the offender. The question is: should the prisoner be concerned about which judge is assigned to his case?
Given the identical behavior and utility loss of both judges for any given belief, one could think that they are equally likely to commit any given mistake. However, this intuition is incorrect: the first judge is more likely to release a guilty suspect and less likely to convict an innocent suspect than the second judge. The key for the result is the opportunity cost of learning. Suppose that the preliminary evidence states that the suspect is likely to be innocent. In this case, the first judge has a higher opportunity cost than the second one to keep accumulating evidence: he is tempted to stop the information acquisition process, and enjoy the high expected payoff of his (hopefully correct) decision to release the prisoner. Conversely, when the preliminary evidence states that the prisoner is guilty, his cost of continuing the acquisition of information is low, given his relatively small variance in payoffs between convicting a guilty and an innocent suspect. He is therefore more likely than the second judge to keep learning, with the corresponding likelihood of reversing his prior. Summing up, these two judges would behave identically if the amount of information collected were fixed or exogenous. However, the asymmetry in the total payoff of making the right decision combined to the costly and endogenous choice of learning implies that, in expectation, they will commit different types of mistakes.
The reader may find obvious the idea that each judge will favor the action that has the potential to yield highest payoff (in equilibrium, the first judge releases more innocents and the second one convicts more guilty suspects). However, one should realize that by adopting such attitude, judges are also committing more often the mistakes that are most costly (the first judge releases more guilty and the second one convicts more innocent suspects). One immediate implication is that, independently of his culpability, the prisoner strictly prefers to have his case handled by the first judge.
Interestingly, one may give another lecture to the example presented above. Suppose that an individual with imperfect self-knowledge must decide between a high-risk and a low-risk activity. Scaling for risk-aversion factors, under endogenous learning the individual is more likely to opt for the risky alternative than under an exogenous flow of information. This alternative interpretation is further explored in section 4.
The plan of the paper is the following. We first present a model with two agents with imperfect information about the state of nature who choose between two actions. For any given belief, the difference in expected utility between the two actions is the same for both agents (section 2). We show that their different incentives to acquire information affects their behavior and expected payoffs (section 3). We then argue that the model and the results immediately extend to the case of one agent with imperfect self-knowledge who learns about his own preferences and manipulates his own choices (section 4). Last, we offer some concluding remarks (section 5).
A model of biased behavior

States, actions and utilities
We consider the following simple model. There are two types of agents in the economy (i ∈ {1, 2}). A type-i agent chooses an action γ i ∈ {a, b}. His utility u i (·) depends on his action γ i and the state of the economy s ∈ {A, B}. Agents have imperfect knowledge about the state s. We denote by p the prior belief shared by all agents that the true state is A, that is Pr(A) = p and Pr(B) = 1 − p.
Type-1 and type-2 agents have different utility functions (i.e., different representation of preferences). However, we will assume that for any given belief p ∈ [0, 1], they both have the same difference in expected utility between the two possible actions. This means not only that they have the same preferred action when confronted to the same evidence, but also that they have the same willingness to pay in order to have the freedom of choosing which action they take. We will say that these two types of agents "for Identical Beliefs are Identical in Behavior and Utility Difference" (IBIBUD). The property is summarized as follows.
Definition Type-1 and type-2 agents are IBIBUD if and only if:
which, in particular, implies that arg max
For expositional purposes, we will consider a specific representation of the utility functions for type-1 and type-2 agents:
with h > l > 0. Under this representation, action a has the greatest variance in payoffs for agent 1 and action b the greatest variance in payoffs for agent 2. Given (1) and (2), the IBIBUD property translates into:
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of these utilities.
Expected utility of type-1 agent. 
Information
In order to answer this question, we need to introduce the information acquisition technology. Learning is formalized in the simplest way. We denote by τ i,t the decision of agent i at a given date t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1}, where T is finite but arbitrarily large. At each date, his options are either to take the optimal action conditional on his current information (τ i,t = γ i ∈ {a, b}) or to wait until the following period (τ i,t = w). The action is irreversible, so if the agent undertakes it, then payoffs are realized and the game ends.
Waiting has costs and benefits. On the one hand, the delay implied by the decision to wait one more period before acting is costly. We denote by δ (< 1) the discount factor.
On the other hand, the agent obtains between dates t and t + 1 one signal σ ∈ {α, β} imperfectly correlated with the true state. Information allows the agent to update his belief and therefore to improve the quality of his future decision. As long as the agent waits, he keeps the option of undertaking action a or b in a future period, except at date T in which waiting is not possible anymore so the agent's options are reduced to actions a and b. 3 The relation between signal and state is the following:
where θ ∈ (1/2, 1) captures the accuracy of information: as θ increases, the informational content of a signal σ also increases (when θ → 1/2 signals are completely uninformative, and when θ → 1 one signal perfectly informs the agent about the true state). 4 Suppose that a number n α of signals α and a number n β of signals β are revealed during the n α + n β periods in which the agent waits. Using standard statistical methods, it is possible to compute the agent's posterior belief about the state of the economy:
It is interesting to notice that the posterior depends only on the difference between the number of signals α and the number of signals β. So, roughly speaking, two different signals "cancel out". The relevant variable which will be used from now on is n ≡ n α − n β ∈ Z.
Also, we define the posterior probability µ(n) ≡ Pr(A | n a , n b ). 5 Last, when solving the model we will treat n as a real number (instead of an integer as we should in order to be fully rigorous). This abuse of notation is made only for technical convenience and it does not affect the substance of our results. Before solving the game, we want to provide a stylized example that illustrates the meaning of the IBIBUD property, the utility representations (1) and (2), and the costly decision to acquire information.
An example: court judgement under civil law
Following the motivating example presented in the introduction, one can interpret our model in terms of a judicial decision. judge i must choose whether to release (action a) or 3 A finite horizon game ensures the existence of a unique stopping rule at each period that can be computed by backward induction. By setting T arbitrarily large we can determine the limiting properties of this stopping rule. 4 It is formally equivalent to increase the correlation between signal and state or to increase the number of signals between two dates (both can be captured with the parameter θ).
5 Some properties of µ(n) are: (i) lim
convict (action b) an offender. The offender is either innocent (state A) or guilty (state B). The prior probability of his being innocent is p = Pr(A). The judge can acquire information about the culpability of the accused (signals σ) at the cost of delaying his sentence. According to (1) and (2), for any belief p, the differential in utility between convicting and releasing the offender is the same for both types of judges (IBIBUD property).
In particular, they both prefer to release the prisoner if his probability of being innocent is greater than 1/2 and convict him otherwise. The main difference is that for judge 1 releasing the suspect is the riskiest choice (u 1 (a) ∈ {−h, h} vs. u 1 (b) ∈ {−l, l}) whereas the opposite is true for judge 2. 6 3 Information acquisition and optimal decision-making
Option value of waiting and optimal stopping rule
In this section we show that under costly acquisition of information two IBIBUD agents may behave in a systematically different way. Given the information revelation structure presented in section 2.2, agents face a trade-off between delay and information. This trade-off has been extensively analyzed in the literature on investment under uncertainty (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a survey). In order to solve the optimal stopping rule, we first determine the value function V t i that a type-i agent maximizes at date t. It can be written as:
where
In words, at a given date t and for a given difference of signals n that implies a posterior µ(n) > 1/2, type-1 agent chooses between taking action a with expected payoff hµ − h(1 − µ) or waiting. In the latter case, signal α (resp. β) is received with probability ν (resp. 1 − ν) and the value function in the following
(n − 1)), discounted at the rate δ. For µ(n) < 1/2, the argument is the same, except that the optimal action if the agent does not wait is b with payoff −lµ + l(1 − µ). The reasoning for a type-2 agent is exactly the same. Given (3) and (4), we can determine the optimal strategy for each type.
Lemma 1 For all δ < 1 and h > l > 0, there exist (n * 1,t , n * * 1,t , n * 2,t , n * * 2,t ) at each date t s.t.:
= a if n n * * 2,t and τ 2,t = w if n ∈ (n * 2,t , n * * 2,t ). By the symmetry of types 1 and 2: µ(n * * 1,t ) = 1 − µ(n * 2,t ) and µ(n * 1,t ) = 1 − µ(n * * 2,t ). Also and most importantly:
The idea is simple. Agents trade-off the costs of delaying their choice between actions a and b with the benefits of acquiring a more accurate information. When µ(n) > 1/2, waiting becomes more costly as n increases, because delaying the action one extra period reduces the expected payoff by an amount proportional to 2µ(n) − 1. Similarly, when µ(n) < 1/2, waiting becomes more costly as n decreases, because delaying the action reduces the expected payoff by an amount proportional to 1 − 2µ(n). In other words, at each date t, there are two cutoffs µ(n * * i,t ) > 1/2 and µ(n * i,t ) < 1/2 for a type-i agent. When µ µ(n * * i,t ), the individual is "reasonably confident" that the true state is A, and when µ µ(n * i,t ), he is "reasonably confident" that the true state is B. In either case, the marginal gain of improving the information about the true state is offset by the marginal cost of a reduction in the expected payoff due to the delay it implies. As a result, he strictly prefers to stop learning and to undertake his optimal action. For intermediate beliefs, that is when µ(n) ∈ (µ(n * i,t ), µ(n * * i,t )), a type-i agent prefers to keep accumulating evidence.
The most interesting property of these cutoffs is that:
It states that the confidence of a type-1 agent on the true state being A when he takes action a is smaller than his confidence on the true state being B when he takes action b.
The opposite is true for a type-2 agent. Comparing the two agents, it means that a type-1 agent will need fewer evidence in favor of A in order to decide to stop collecting news and take action a and more evidence in favor of B in order to stop collecting news and take action b than a type-2 agent.
The intuition for this result is simply that, given the delay associated to the accumulation of evidence, the marginal cost of learning is a function of the agent's current expected payoff. For a type-1 individual, it is proportional to h(1 − δ) when µ > 1/2 and to l(1 − δ) when µ < 1/2. As a result and other things being equal, it is then relatively less interesting to keep experimenting when the currently optimal action is a rather than b. The argument for a type-2 agent is symmetric. The shape of these cutoffs is graphically represented in Figure 2 .
Stopping rule for a type-2 agent.
Stopping rule for a type-1 agent. Suppose now that T → ∞. This means that n * i,t → n * i and n * * i,t → n * * i for all t. Denote by Pr(τ i = γ i | s) the probability that a type-i individual eventually undertakes action γ i (∈ {a, b}) when the true state is s (∈ {A, B}). Also, let µ * * ≡ µ(n * * 1 ) and µ * ≡ µ(n * 1 ) (which means that µ(n * * 2 ) = 1 − µ * and µ(n * 2 ) = 1 − µ * * ). Last, suppose that a type-1 and a type-2 agent start with the same prior belief p ∈ (1 − µ * * , µ * * ). Each agent chooses the amount of information collected before undertaking an action and the signals obtained by the agents are independent. Their optimal stopping rule is given by Lemma 1. In the main proposition of the paper, we compare the relative probabilities that each agent undertakes action a and action b.
Proposition 1 For all p ∈ (1 − µ * * , µ * * ), δ < 1, h > l > 0 and when T → ∞ we have:
releases guilty suspects more often and convicts innocent suspects less often than judge 2.
(ii)
keeping IBIBUD, greater spread in payoffs |h − l| increases the difference in behavior between judge 1 and judge 2.
Proof. Part (i) is a direct consequence of µ(n * * 2 ) > µ(n * * 1 ) and µ(n * 2 ) > µ(n * 1 ). Part (ii) results from the fact that, also by Lemma 1, 
Naturally, the results of Proposition 1 can be confirmed using these expressions.
2
Proposition 1 shows that, even if type-1 and type-2 agents are IBIBUD, they will make systematically different choices, at least in a stochastic sense. As shown in Lemma 1, a type-1 agent is relatively more likely to stop collecting news when the preliminary evidence points towards the optimality of action a than when it points towards the optimality of action b (i.e. when the first few signals are mainly α and not β). Stated differently, the evidence in favor of A needed to induce a type-1 agent to take action a is smaller than the evidence in favor of B needed to induce him to take action b. The opposite is true for a type-2 agent. As a result, in equilibrium, a type-1 agent is more likely to take action a by mistake (i.e. when the true state is B) and less likely to take action b by mistake (i.e. when the true state is A) than a type-2 agent (part (i) of the proposition). Note that the endogenous choice to acquire information is crucial for this result: by definition of IBIBUD, the two types of agents would take action a with the same probability if the number of signals they receive were exogenously given. Last, as the difference between the two maximum payoffs (h − l) increases, the likelihood that the two agents behave differently also increases: type-1 takes more often action a by mistake and less often action b by mistake whereas type-2 takes less often action a by mistake and more often action b by mistake (part (ii) of the proposition).
Where does this lead to? It means that despite the similarities between these two judges, their actual behavior can be substantially different: judge 1 releases guilty suspects more often and convicts innocent suspects less often than judge 2. A suspect will then strictly prefer to face judge 1 rather than judge 2, independently of his culpability. Note that agents select a stopping rule that increases the probability of taking the action with highest payoff: the utility for judge 1 of releasing an innocent and for judge 2 of convicting a guilty is h in both cases. This might seem a trivial conclusion. However, after some consideration, it is not straightforward. In fact, the other side of the coin is that, with this strategy, agents are also increasing the probability of making the mistakes that are most costly: the utility for judge 1 of releasing a guilty and for judge 2 of convicting an innocent is −h in both cases. The paper thus provides one simple reason for the different propensity of apparently similar individuals to commit different types of errors.
Remark 1.
It should be now clear that when we refer to a "bias", we do not mean that agents are fooled, deceived or misled. Systematic "mistakes" are, by definition, impossible in our setting given the agents' rationality both in their acquisition of information and choice of action. However, their equilibrium choice can be systematically tilted towards certain actions. For example, consider two cities, one with type-1 and the other with type-2 judges. Half of the suspects are guilty in each city. Our model predicts that fewer suspects will be condemned (both rightly and wrongly) in the first city than in the second one. Technically, the point is simply that the endogenous decision to acquire information cannot affect the first-order moment of beliefs (i.e., the average belief in the population always coincides with the true average). However, it may influence the higherorder moments and, in particular, the skewness of the distribution of beliefs. Given a limited set of actions, two populations whose distribution of beliefs have the same average but different skewness will exhibit different aggregate behaviors.
Remark 2. The model builds on irreversibility of actions and no learning after the decision is made. These assumptions are quite natural in the judgement example but may be somewhat extreme in other contexts. However, one should realize that partial irreversibility of actions is enough to generate this effect. Also, even if we assumed that the agent keeps learning after his decision is made and can switch back anytime, the same result still applies: in the short run, the agent biases his behavior towards the riskier of the two alternatives. 8 Remark 3. Our model argues that agents favor actions with higher rather than lower variance in payoffs, and at some point we have referred to these choices as "riskier" vs.
"safer". Needless to say, despite these convenient labels we are not building a general theory of decision-making under risk: if in a particular setting risk-aversion factors crowdout any other motivations, then agents will choose the safe alternative independently of their type. 9 The model has nothing to say on this issue.
Comparative statics
Whether the effects highlighted in Proposition 1 are of considerable importance is an empirical issue, interesting but largely beyond the scope of this paper. In this section, we simply want to provide simple numerical examples that give an idea of the propensity of agents to make different types of mistakes. Consider the extreme situation in which h > 0 and l → 0. 10 From the proof of Proposition 1, the probability that a type-i agent makes the wrong decision is:
A type-1 agent will never take action b mistakenly, and a type-2 agent will never take action a mistakenly. Simple comparative statics about the likelihood of taking the wrong action given a prior probability p and a stopping posterior µ * * are illustrated in Figure 3 .
8 Note that, from a theoretical viewpoint, the "short-run" can be as long as we want. Also, if the environment changes stochastically, information becomes obsolete. Hence, even in the long run there can be enough uncertainty to prevent the agent from making always the right choices.
9 Formally, if convicted innocents die in jail, then all judges will be highly averse to this type of mistakes
10 This means that n * 1 → −∞, n * * 2 → +∞ and therefore µ * → 0. This assumption is by no means necessary. However, it makes the comparative statics much more neat as it reduces the number of parameters to two (p and µ * * ). he releases only one-half of the innocent suspects and convicts all the guilty suspects and one-half of the innocent ones. Last, note that µ * * is increasing in δ, and lim δ→1 µ * * = 1. This means simply that, if individuals are infinitely patient, the cost of waiting vanishes. It then becomes optimal for both types to be perfectly informed before choosing any action, and therefore no mistakes occur in equilibrium.
Welfare analysis
Suppose that a welfare maximizing principal can ask several agents their opinion about which action a or b should be taken. For simplicity, we assume that each agent is interested in maximizing the probability of providing the correct appraisal (a if A and b if B), independently of whether the suggestion is followed by the principal or not. Such behavior is rational if agents have career-concerns and their payoff is a function of the accuracy of their suggestion, and not a function of the final action taken. In this setting, each agent's optimal rule for the acquisition of information coincides with that of Lemma 1. 11
If individuals receive independent signals about the true state, then increasing the number of agents can only decrease the probability of an incorrect decision. However, recall that the two types of agents have different biases in the errors they commit. Suppose that the principal can choose the proportion of type-1 and type-2 agents. Is it optimal to select all agents of the same type or to have appraisals from agents of both types?
To answer this question, we consider the simplest version of our model (this can be generalized in a number of dimensions). We denote by γ j i the recommendation made by the jth agent of type-i. We suppose that l → 0, so that Pr(γ j 1 = b | A) = 0 and Pr(γ j 2 = a | B) = 0 for all j. The total number of agents is fixed and equal to n. The principal chooses x, the number of type-1 agents (n − x being the number of type-2 agents). Last, the principal's sole concern is to minimize the probability of a mistake (i.e., it is equally costly to take action a when s = B than action b when s = A). If we denote by γ P ∈ {a, b} the action taken eventually by the principal, we have the following result.
and Pr(γ P = a | B) = 0.
Proof. Fix x. Given l → 0, we have Pr(γ 1 = b | A) = 0 and Pr(γ 2 = a | B) = 0, so the only possible error arises when all type-1 agents announce γ j 1 = a (j ∈ {1, ..., x}) and all type-2 agents announce γ k 2 = b (k ∈ {1, ..., n − x}). The remaining question is whether, if this happens, the principal will take action a or action b.
• Suppose that the principal minimizes costs with γ P = a. The expected loss is then:
So, conditional on taking γ P = a, the principal optimally sets x = n, and the loss is:
11 By contrast, if individuals were rewarded as a function of the quality of the final decision taken, then they should integrate the behavior of the other agents in their decision to acquire information (and, possibly, free-ride accordingly). The optimal stopping rule would then be modified.
• Suppose that the principal minimizes costs with γ P = b. The expected loss is then:
So, conditional on taking γ P = b, the principal optimally sets x = 0, and the loss is:
Last, from (5) and (6):
Proposition 2 states that even if the principal can choose the source of information, a systematic bias in his choice is likely to persist. The idea is simple. Since the principal dislikes equally both types of errors, he will select agents so as to minimize their likelihood of committing a mistake, independently of the nature. Given l → 0, type-1 (resp. type-2) agents can never mistakenly recommend action b (resp. a). We also know from Proposition 1 that the likelihood of providing an incorrect appraisal is inversely proportional to the distance between the prior belief and the posterior at which the agent decides to stop collecting evidence and recommends an action (formally, µ * * − p for a type-1 agent and p − (1 − µ * * ) for a type-2 agent). Hence, if p < 1/2, type-1 agents are relatively less likely to mislead the principal than type-2 agents (|µ * * − p| > |p − (1 − µ * * )|), and therefore it is optimal to select only this type of individuals. The opposite is true when p > 1/2.
Overall, fewer mistakes will occur as we increase the number of agents who provide an appraisal. However, the systematic bias in the final decision is going to persist. The career choice of this individual can be formally represented using our previous model of a type-1 agent. Denote a the decision to concentrate on sports, b the decision to concentrate on intellectual education and w the decision to pursue both activities and wait some time before making a choice. States A and B denote respectively a person with high talent and low talent for sport (say, relative to his talent for intellectual activities), with p being the individual's own initial assessment of his talent. Last, the individual is only concerned with earnings. These are highest for a talented sport player (h), lowest for an untalented sport player (−h), and average for someone who chooses an intellectual career (0 for simplicity).
According to our theory and other things being equal, an adolescent will first combine the intellectual and sport activities and start learning about his talent. Limited information suggesting a brilliant sports career (i.e., few α-signals) will be enough to persuade him to concentrate all his efforts on the sport activity. By contrast, a large amount of negative information about his sport talent (i.e., many β-signals) are needed to induce him to focus on an intellectual career. Overall, we will observe more individuals choosing a sport career by mistake (i.e., in spite of a low talent for sports relative to education) than individuals pursuing an intellectual career by mistake (i.e., in spite of a low talent for education relative to sports). 12 The example presented above is obviously simplistic and, as such, should not be taken literally (also, the caveat mentioned in footnote 2 applies here). However, it demonstrates a general point: when costly information is available, individuals will systematically bias their choices towards the alternative with the potential to generate the highest payoff (a sports career), even at the expense of risking to obtain the lowest payoff. 13 Can we label this behavior as "self-influence"? In a sense, the choice of this specific stopping rule in the acquisition of information can be seen as a (conscious or unconscious)
attempt towards a self-bias: the individual is convincing himself that he has good reasons 12 Note that, in this example, learning about talent in at least one of the activities never stops and switching the career focus is always feasible. However, recall that all that matters for our theory is partial irreversibility of actions (see Remark 1) . Therefore, the same results apply as long as the individual has a handicap in going back to studies (resp. professional sport) after a number of years dedicated entirely to sport (resp. intellectual studies), an assumption that seems reasonable.
13 Symmetry of payoffs (h, 0, −h) is not necessary for the result, although it makes the comparison more clear cut.
to take one particular action. However, we have also proved that such stopping rule is optimal for a rational person given his structure of payoffs and the costs of learning.
Whether we think of it as self-influence or not, the main message is that from an observed or reported systematic bias in the behavior of individuals we cannot conclude the existence of an irrational bias in their belief.
Concluding remarks
Incentives for decision-making in judicial contexts has received the attention of economists in the past recent years (see e.g. Shin (1998) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) ). Our paper can be seen as another step in this important research area, as it shows how judges with very similar preferences may end up behaving quite differently and committing the opposite types of mistakes. However, we think that our model and results are of interest for a larger class of problems. The paper has explored the distinction between (irrational) systematically biased beliefs and (rational) systematically biased behaviors that result from the endogenous and costly decision to acquire information. We have pointed out as our major conclusion that individuals will have a tendency to bias their decisions in favor of the actions that have the potential to generate the highest payoff even if these may also generate the lowest payoff.
Naturally, it would be absurd to conclude that our explanation can account for all biases documented in the psychology literature. First, because the ingredients of our model are not relevant in many settings. 14 Second, because some aggregate beliefs are impossible to reconcile with statistical inference. 15 And third, because the behavioralist explanations reviewed in the introduction seem to do a good job in some situations. Yet, we feel that adding this extra element to the discussion can be very useful if we want to improve our understanding of the reasons, means and situations where individuals systematically distort their behaviors.
14 Among other things, stakes have to be sufficiently small, otherwise the incentives of individuals to become perfectly informed before choosing their optimal action will crowd-out other motivations. Also, incomplete information and costly learning have to be crucial elements at play. 15 Bayesian inference can be compatible with more than half of the population believing to be above average. However, as explained earlier, the average belief cannot exceed the true average.
Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
Type-1 agent.
Date T . Denote V T 1 (n) = max{h(2µ(n) − 1); l(1 − 2µ(n))} and let:
For t = T , we have Y T 1 (n) = max{0; (h + l)(1 − 2µ(n))} and W T 1 (n) = max{0; (h + l)(2µ(n) − 1)}. Since µ(n) is increasing in n, W T 1 (n) is non-decreasing and Y T 1 (n) is nonincreasing in n. Besides, lim n→+∞ µ(n) = 1 and lim n→−∞ µ(n) = 0, so there exists n defined by µ(n) = 1/2 such that for all n > n then τ 1,T = a, and for all n < n then
(n) is defined on (n, +∞). Since ν(n) is increasing in n and Y T 1 (n) is nonincreasing in n, we can check that the right-hand side (r.h.s.) of Y T −1 1 (n) is decreasing in n, and therefore there exists a cutoff n * * 1,T −1 such that for all n > n * * 1,T −1 then τ 1,T −1 = a, and for all n ∈ [n, n * * 1,T −1 ) then τ 1,T −1 = w. To solve the previous equation, the cutoff has to be such that n * * 1,T −1 + 1 n and n * * 1,T −1 − 1 < n, and therefore it is the solution of:
where f (n * * 1,T −1 , δ) ≡ 2µ(n * * 1,T −1 ) − 1 − δν(n * * 1,T −1 )(2µ(n * * 1,T −1 + 1) − 1) and g(n * * 1,T −1 , δ) = δ(1 − ν(n * * 1,T −1 ))(1 − 2µ(n * * 1,T −1 − 1)). Differentiating with respect to h, l and δ we have: Given f (n * * 1,T −1 , δ) > 0, g(n * * 1,T −1 , δ) > 0, l · g n (n * * 1,T −1 , δ) − h · f n (n * * 1,T −1 , δ) < 0, h · f δ (n * * 1,T −1 , δ) − l · g δ (n * * 1,T −1 , δ) < 0, we finally have: ∂n * * 16 The subscripts n and δ denote a partial derivative with respect to that argument.
and for all n ∈ (n * 1,t−1 , n] then τ 1,t−1 = w. Also, given (A2'), the r.h.s. of W t−1 1 (n) is greater or equal than the r.h.s. of W t 1 (n) and therefore W t−1 1 (n) W t 1 (n). Overall, both (A1') and (A2') hold at date t − 1. Furthermore, n * 1,t−1 < n * 1,t . Now, denote:
1 (n, h) = max{0, −(1 − δ)l(1 − 2µ(n)) + δν(n)W t 1 (n + 1, h) + δ(1 − ν(n))W t 1 (n − 1, h)} W t−1 1 (n, h ) = max{0, −(1 − δ)l(1 − 2µ(n)) + δν(n)W t 1 (n + 1, h ) + δ(1 − ν(n))W t 1 (n − 1, h )} By (A3'), if h > h then W t 1 (n + 1, h) W t 1 (n + 1, h ) and W t 1 (n − 1, h) W t 1 (n − 1, h ). Therefore, W t−1 1 (n, h) W t−1 1 (n, h ). This means that (A3') holds at date t − 1 and, as a consequence, that ∂n * 1,t−1 /∂h < 0. Using a similar reasoning, it is immediate that (A4') and (A5') also hold at t − 1 and therefore that ∂n * 1,t−1 /∂l > 0 and ∂n * 1,t−1 /∂δ < 0.
Type-2 agent.
From equations (1) and (2), it is immediate to notice that type-1 and type-2 agents are fully symmetric. Therefore, if at date t there exists n * * 1,t s.t. τ 1,t = a if n > n * * 1,t and τ 1,t = w if n ∈ [n, n * * 1,t ), then there also exists n * 2,t s.t. τ 2,t = b if n < n * 2,t and τ 2,t = w if n ∈ (n * 2,t , n]. Furthermore, n * 2,t is such that n − n * 2,t = n * * 1,t − n, that is µ(n * * 1,t ) = 1 − µ(n * 2,t ). Similarly, if at date t there exists n * 1,t s.t. τ 1,t = b if n < n * 1,t and τ 1,t = w if n ∈ (n * 1,t , n], then there also exists n * * 2,t s.t. τ 2,t = a if n > n * * 2,t and τ 2,t = w if n ∈ [n, n * 2,t ). Furthermore, n * * 2,t is such that n * * 2,t − n = n − n * 1,t , that is µ(n * 1,t ) = 1 − µ(n * * 2,t ).
Note that if h = l, then for all t we have µ(n * 1,t ) = 1 − µ(n * * 1,t ) and µ(n * 2,t ) = 1 − µ(n * * 2,t ). As a result, n * 2,t = n * 1,t < n and n * * 2,t = n * * 1,t > n. Also, we know that ∂h > 0). Therefore, for all h > l we have n * 1,t < n * 2,t < n < n * * 1,t < n * * 2,t .
Summing up, when δ < 1, h > l > 0 and T → +∞, we have n * 1 < n * 2 < n < n * * 1 < n * * 2 where µ(n * * 1 ) = 1 − µ(n * 2 ) and µ(n * 1 ) = 1 − µ(n * * 2 ). Moreover, 
